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Abstract—Consensus is fundamental for distributed systems
since it underpins key functionalities of such systems ranging
from distributed information fusion, decision-making, to de-
centralized control. In order to reach an agreement, existing
consensus algorithms require each agent to exchange explicit
state information with its neighbors. This leads to the disclosure
of private state information, which is undesirable in cases where
privacy is of concern. In this paper, we propose a novel approach
for undirected networks which can enable secure and privacy-
preserving average consensus in a decentralized architecture in
the absence of an aggregator or third-party. By leveraging partial
homomorphic cryptography to embed secrecy in pairwise inter-
action dynamics, our approach can guarantee convergence to the
consensus value (subject to a quantization error) in a deterministic
manner without disclosing a node’s state to its neighbors. We
provide a new privacy definition for dynamical systems, and give
a new framework to rigorously prove that a node’s privacy can
be protected as long as it has at least one legitimate neighbor
which follows the consensus protocol faithfully without attempts
to infer other nodes’ states. In addition to enabling resilience to
passive attackers aiming to steal state information, the approach
also allows easy incorporation of defending mechanisms against
active attackers who try to alter the content of exchanged
messages. Furthermore, in contrast to existing noise-injection
based privacy-preserving mechanisms which have to reconfigure
the entire network when the topology or number of nodes
varies, our approach is applicable to dynamic environments
with time-varying coupling topologies. This secure and privacy-
preserving approach is also applicable to weighted average
consensus as well as maximum/minimum consensus under a new
update rule. Numerical simulations and comparison with existing
approaches confirm the theoretical results. Experimental results
on a Raspberry-Pi board based micro-controller network are
also presented to verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the
approach.
Index Terms—Consensus, privacy preservation, security, par-
tial homomorphic cryptography, digital signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a building block of distributed computing, average con-
sensus as well as its various variants such as weighted average
consensus and maximum/minimum consensus has been an
active research topic in computer science and optimization
for decades [2], [3]. In recent years, with the advances of
wireless communications and embedded systems, particularly
the advent of wireless sensor networks and the Internet-of-
Things, average consensus is finding increased applications in
fields as diverse as automatic control, signal processing, social
sciences, robotics, and optimization [4].
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Conventional consensus approaches employ the explicit
exchange of state values among neighboring nodes to reach
agreement on the computation. Such an explicit exchange of
state information has two potential problems. First, it results in
breaches of the privacy of participating nodes who may want
to keep their state information confidential. For example, a
group of individuals using average consensus to compute a
common opinion may want to keep their personal opinions
secret [5]. Another example is power systems where multiple
generators want to reach agreement on cost while keeping
their individual generation information private [6]. Secondly,
storing or exchanging information in the unencrypted plaintext
form is vulnerable to attackers who can steal information by
hacking into the communication links or even the nodes. With
the increased number of reported attack events and the growing
awareness of security, keeping data encrypted in storage and
communications has become the norm in many applications,
particularly in many real-time sensing and control systems
such as power systems and wireless sensor networks.
To address the pressing need for privacy and security in
consensus, recently several solutions have been proposed.
Most existing approaches use the idea of obfuscation to mask
the true state values by adding noise on the state. Motivated
by database privacy in computer science, [7]–[11] exploited
differential privacy to inject uncorrelated noise in average
consensus. However, differential-privacy based approaches do
not provide the exact average value due to their fundamental
trade-off between enabled privacy and computational accuracy.
To guarantee computational accuracy, [12]–[14] proposed to
inject correlated noise to exchanged messages to guarantee
convergence to the exact value, which, however, also leads
to vulnerabilities to external eavesdroppers, as shown in our
numerical simulations in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9. Furthermore,
these approaches normally rely on the assumption of a time-
invariant interaction graph, which is difficult to satisfy in
many practical applications where the interaction patterns may
change due to node mobility or fading communication chan-
nels. Observability based approaches have also been discussed
to protect the privacy of multi-agent networks. The basic idea
is to design the interaction topology so as to minimize the
observability from a compromised agent, which amounts to
minimizing its ability to infer the initial states of other network
agents [15]–[17]. However, these approaches cannot protect
the privacy of the direct neighbors of the compromised agent.
Neither can the aforementioned approaches protect nodes
from active attackers who try to steal or even alter exchanged
information by hacking into the nodes or the communication
channels. To improve resilience to such attacks, a common
approach is to employ cryptography. However, it is worth
noting that although cryptography based approaches can easily
provide privacy and security when an aggregator or third-
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party is available [18], like in cloud-based control or compu-
tation [19]–[21], their extension to completely decentralized
average consensus without any aggregators or third-parties
is extremely hard due to the difficulties in decentralized key
management.
In this paper, we propose a homomorphic cryptography
based approach for undirected networks that can guarantee
the security and privacy of a node as long as it has at
least one legitimate neighbor. Here, a legitimate neighbor is
defined as a neighboring node who follows the consensus
protocol faithfully without attempts to infer other nodes’ states.
Compared with differential-privacy based approaches in [7]–
[11] which trade accuracy for privacy and correlated-noise
based approaches in [12]–[14] which are vulnerable to external
eavesdroppers, our approach can guarantee both the accuracy
of consensus and resilience against external eavesdroppers.
Despite the increased computational complexity caused by
encryption, our approach is still manageable for resource
constrained low-cost micro-controllers, as analyzed in detail
in Sec. III and experimentally validated in Sec. VIII-C. Unlike
the existing cryptography based average consensus approach
in [22] and [23], our approach allows every participating node
to access the exact final value, and hence can be used in
numerous applications where each agent has to use the precise
consensus value to achieve cooperative control or information
fusion.
The main contributions of the paper are as follows: 1)
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to unify encryption
and control dynamics in a completely decentralized manner
without the assistance of a third party; 2) Our paper provides
a new privacy definition for dynamical systems, and gives
a new framework to rigorously prove that a node’s privacy
can be protected as long as it has at least one legitimate
neighbor; 3) Our approach can be easily extended to provide
security against active attackers aiming to alter the content of
exchanged messages; and 4) We experimentally verified the
efficiency of our approach using a Raspberry-Pi board based
micro-controller network.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Sec. II reviews the
average consensus problem and the homomorphic cryptogra-
phy, particularly the Paillier cryptosystem. Our confidential
interaction protocol is introduced in Sec. III. In Sec. IV we
theoretically analyze the condition and rate of convergence,
followed by a systematic discussion of privacy guarantees
as well as security enforcement mechanisms in Sec. V. We
further demonstrate in Sec. VI that our confidential interaction
protocol can be extended to weighted average consensus
and maximum/minimum consensus under a new update rule.
Some implementation issues are discussed in Sec. VII. Both
numerical examples and hardware experiments (on Raspberry
Pi boards) are presented in Sec. VIII. The conclusion is drawn
in Sec. IX.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we briefly review the average consensus
problem and the homomorphic encryption.
A. Average Consensus
We follow the same convention as in [4] where a net-
work of N agents is represented by an undirected graph
G = (V, E, A) with node set V = {v1, v2, · · · vN}, edge
set E ⊂ V × V , and a weighted adjacency matrix A = [aij ]
which satisfies aij > 0 if (vi, vj) ∈ E and 0 otherwise. The
set of neighbors of a node vi is denoted as
Ni = {vj ∈ V |(vi, vj) ∈ E} (1)
Throughout this paper we assume that the graph is undirected
and connected. Therefore, A is symmetric
a
(k)
ij = a
(k)
ji > 0 ∀(vi, vj) ∈ E (2)
Note that the superscript k denotes that the weights are time-
varying. Sometimes we drop k for the sake of notational
simplicity, but it is worth noting that all discussions in the
paper are always applicable under time-varying weights. To
achieve average consensus, namely converging of all states
xi[k] (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) to the average of initial values, i.e.,∑N
j=1 xj [0]
N , one commonly-used update rule is
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + ε
∑
vj∈Ni
a
(k)
ij (xj [k]− xi[k]) (3)
where ε is a constant step size.
B. Homomorphic Encryption
Our method to protect privacy and security is to encrypt the
state. To this end, we briefly introduce a cryptosystem, more
specifically the public-key cryptosystem which is applicable in
open and dynamic networks without the assist of any trusted
third party for key management. A public-key cryptosystem
uses two keys – a private key (also called secret key) and
a public key distributed publicly. Any person can encrypt
messages using a public key, but such messages can only be
decrypted by the agents who have access to the private key.
Most popular cryptosystems such as RSA [24], ElGamal [25],
and Paillier [26] are public-key cryptosystems. In this paper
we focus on the Pailler cryptosystem. We adopt a simplified
version of the Pailler cryptosystem from [27] which has the
following basic functions:
• Key generation:
1) Choose two large prime numbers p ∈ Z and q ∈ Z of
equal bit-length and compute n = pq.
2) Let λ = φ(n) = (p−1)(q−1) where φ(·) is the Euler’s
totient function.
3) Let µ = φ(n)−1 mod n which is the modular
multiplicative inverse of φ(n).
4) The public key kp is then n.
5) The private key ks is then (λ, µ).
• Encryption (c = E(m) ∈ Z∗n2 ):
Recall the definitions of Zn = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n}
and Z∗n = {z|z ∈ Z, 0 ≤ z < n, gcd(z, n) = 1} where
gcd(a, b) is the greatest common divisor of a and b.
1) Choose a random r ∈ Z∗n.
2) The ciphertext is given by c = (n + 1)mrn mod n2,
where m ∈ Zn, c ∈ Z∗n2 .
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• Decryption (m = D(c) ∈ Zn):
1) Define the integer division function L(u) = u−1n .
2) The plaintext is m = L(cλ mod n2)µ mod n.
A cryptosystem is homomorphic if it allows certain com-
putations to be carried out on the encrypted ciphertext. The
Paillier cryptosystem is additive homomorphic because the
ciphertext of m1 + m2, i.e., E(m1 + m2), can be obtained
from E(m1) and E(m2) directly:
E(m1, r1)E(m2, r2) =((n+ 1)m1r1n)((n+ 1)m2r2n) mod n2
=((n+ 1)m1+m2(r1r2)
n) mod n2
=E(m1 +m2, r1r2)
(4)
The dependency on random numbers r1 and r2 is explicitly
shown in (4), yet they play no role in the decryption. There-
fore, the following shorthand notation will be used instead:
E(m1)E(m2) = E(m1 +m2) (5)
Moreover, if we multiply the same ciphertext k ∈ Z+ times,
we can obtain
E(m)k =
k∏
i=1
E(m) = E(
k∑
i=1
m) = E(km) (6)
Notice however, the Paillier cryptosystem is not multiplicative
homomorphic because k in (6) is in the plaintext form.
Furthermore, the existence of the random number r in Paillier
cryptosystem gives it resistance to dictionary attacks [28]
which infer a key to an encrypted message by systematically
trying all possibilities, like exhausting all words in a dictionary.
Moreover, since Paillier cryptography only works on numbers
that can be represented by binary strings, we multiply a real-
valued state by a large integer Q before converting it to a
binary string so as to ensure small quantization errors. The
details will be discussed in Sec. VII-A.
III. CONFIDENTIAL INTERACTION PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a completely decentralized,
third-party free confidential interaction protocol that can guar-
antee average consensus while protecting the privacy of all
participating nodes. Instead of adding noise to hide the states,
our approach combines encryption with randomness in the
system dynamics, i.e., the coupling weights a(k)ij ∈ R, to
prevent two communicating parties in a pairwise interaction
from exposing information to each other. In this way the states
are free from being contaminated by covering noise, guaran-
teeing a deterministic convergence to the average (subject to
a quantization error). The computational complexity of this
protocol is also discussed in this section.
We first present details of our confidential interaction pro-
tocol based on (3). In particular we show how a node can
obtain the weighted difference (7) between itself and any of its
neighbor(s) without disclosing each other’s state information:
∆xij [k] =a
(k)
ij (xj [k]− xi[k])
∆xji[k] =a
(k)
ji (xi[k]− xj [k])
subject to a(k)ij = a
(k)
ji > 0
(7)
Plugging the state difference (7) into (3) gives a new formu-
lation of average consensus
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + ε
∑
vj∈Ni
∆xij [k] (8)
Notice that in a decentralized system it is impossible to
protect the privacy of both nodes in a pairwise interaction
if the protocol (7) is used without a third party distributing
secret a(k)ij . This is due to the fact that even if we encrypt
all the intermediate steps, if one node, for instance vi, has
access to a(k)ij , it can still infer the value of xj [k] through
xj [k] = ∆xij [k]/a
(k)
ij + xi[k]. From now on, for the sake of
simplicity in bookkeeping, we omit the superscript k in a(k)ij .
But it is worth noting that all the results hold for time-varying
weights.
We solve this problem by constructing each weight aij as
the product of two random numbers, namely aij = aji =
aijaji with aij randomly generated by and only known
to node vi and aji randomly generated by and only known
to node vj . We will show later that this weight construction
approach renders two interacting nodes unable to infer each
other’s state while guaranteeing convergence to the average.
Next, without loss of generality, we consider a pair of con-
nected nodes (v1, v2) to illustrate the idea (cf. Fig. 1). For
simplicity, we assume that the states x1 and x2 are scalar.
Each node maintains its own public and private key pairs
(kpi, ksi), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Due to symmetry, we only show how node v1 obtains the
weighted state difference, i.e., the flow v1 → v2 → v1. Before
starting the information exchange, node v1 (resp. v2) generates
its new random number a12 (resp. a21). First, node v1
sends its encrypted negative state E1(−x1) as well as the
public key kp1 to node v2. Note that here the subscript in
E1 denotes encryption using the public key of node v1. Node
v2 then computes the encrypted a21-weighted difference
E1 (a21(x2 − x1)) following the three steps below:
1) Encrypt x2 with v1’s public key kp1: x2 → E1(x2).
2) Compute the difference directly in ciphertext:
E1(x2 − x1) = E1(x2 + (−x1)) = E1(x2)E1(−x1) (9)
3) Compute the a21-weighted difference in ciphertext:
E1 (a21(x2 − x1)) = (E1(x2 − x1))a21 (10)
Then v2 returns E1 (a21(x2 − x1)) to v1. After receiving
E1 (a21(x2 − x1)), v1 decrypts it using the private key ks1
and multiplies the result with a12 to get the weighted
difference ∆x12:
E1 (a21(x2 − x1)) D1−−→ a21(x2 − x1)
∆x12 = a12a21(x2 − x1) (11)
In a similar manner, the exchange v2 → v1 → v2 produces
E2 (a12(x1 − x2)) for v2 who then decrypts the message and
multiplies the result by its own multiplier a21 to get ∆x21
E2 (a12(x1 − x2)) D2−−→ a12(x1 − x2)
∆x21 = a21a12(x1 − x2) (12)
3
v1 v2
Initial State x1, a12, (kp1, ks1), x2, a21, (kp2, ks2),
Encrypt the Negative
State (with its own key) E1(−x1)
E(−x1, kp1)
E2(−x2)
E(−x2, kp2)
Transmit the State
and Public Key E2(−x2), kp2 E1(−x1), kp1
Encrypt the State
(with received key) E2(x1)
E(x1, kp2)
E1(x2)
E(x2, kp1)
Compute the Difference
(in ciphertext) E2(x1 − x2)
E2(x1)E2(−x2)
E1(x2 − x1)
E1(x2)E1(−x1)
Multiply the Weight
(in ciphertext) E2(a12(x1 − x2))
E2(x1 − x2)a12
E1(a21(x2 − x1))
E1(x2 − x1)a21
Transmit the Result
Back to Sender
E1(a21(x2 − x1)) E2(a12(x1 − x2))
Decrypt the Result a21(x2 − x1)
D(·, ks1)
a12(x1 − x2)
D(·, ks2)
Multiply the Weight
(in plaintext)
∆x12 =
a12a21(x2 − x1)
a12(·)
∆x21 =
a21a12(x1 − x2)
a21(·)
Fig. 1. A step-by-step illustration of the confidential interaction protocol.
Single arrows indicate the flow of computations; double arrows indicate
data exchange via a communication channel. Shaded nodes indicate the
computation done in ciphertext. Note that a12 and a21 are different from
step to step.
After each node collects the weighted differences from all
neighbors, it updates its state with (8) accordingly.
Several remarks are in order:
• The construction of each aij as the product of two random
numbers aij and aji is key to guarantee that the
weights are symmetric, i.e., aij = aji, which is necessary
for average consensus. Note that the coupling weights
aij are randomly chosen by individual nodes and are
completely independent of communication channels.
• In the initial iteration k = 0, node vi ∈ V chooses
aij randomly from the set of real numbers R, which
is critical for privacy preservation, as will be clear in
the proof of Theorem 3. After the initial iteration, i.e.,
for k ≥ 1, node vi ∈ V chooses aij randomly from a
finite admissible range [a, a¯]. Note that aij can have any
random distribution in [a, a¯] such as uniform, reciprocal,
and truncated Gaussian.
• To guarantee the convergence of average consensus, the
admissible range [a, a¯] must satisfy 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
where ε is the constant step size in (3) and ∆ ,
maxi |Ni| with |•| denoting the set cardinality. Therefore,
a smaller ε means a larger a¯, which results in an extended
admissible range [a, a¯] in the selection of the random
number aij .
• v2 does not have the private key of v1 and cannot see x1
which is encrypted in E1(−x1).
• Given a21(x2 − x1), v1 cannot solve for x2 because
a21 is only known to v2.
• At each iteration, real-valued states are converted to
fixed point representation for encryption; the weighted
differences are converted back to real values for update.
• We encrypt E1(−x1) because it is much more difficult
to compute subtraction in ciphertext. The issue regarding
encrypting negative values using Paillier is discussed in
Sec. VII.
• Different from [22] and [23] which deprive individual
nodes from accessing the average value (note that in [23]
individual participating nodes do not have the decryption
key to decrypt the final consensus value which is in the
encrypted form, otherwise they will be able to decrypt
intermediate computations to access other nodes’ states),
our approach enables every node to calculate the average
value in a completely decentralized manner, and hence
can be used in numerous applications where each agent
relies on the precise consensus value to achieve cooper-
ative control or information fusion.
Next we analyze the complexity of our confidential interac-
tion protocol. Note that, although the key generation process
is typically the most time consuming step, it incurs a one-time
fixed cost. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the keys
are reused for subsequent steps.
Lemma 1: Under our confidential interaction protocol il-
lustrated in Fig. 1, for a particular node vi in a connected
network, the total computation overhead of each iteration is
O(|Ni|l) where |Ni| is the number of neighboring nodes of
node vi and l is the bit length of the public key n.
Proof : The encryption step requires two modulo exponen-
tiation steps which can be computed in O(l + log(m)) time,
where m is the message’s integer value and l is the bit length
of the public key n [29]. The multiplication and modulo steps
are both O(1). In practice the length of the public key n is
much longer than the size of m, so the complexity of the
encryption is assumed to be O(l).
The decryption step requires one modulo exponentiation,
one subtraction, one division followed by a multiplication and
a modulo operation. The overall time complexity is O(l).
During each message exchange, node vi must encrypt its
own message once and decrypt |Ni| return messages, so
the overall complexity is O((|Ni| + 1)l). For each |Ni| in-
bound messages, node vi has to encrypt its own message,
compute the difference, and then modulo-exponentiate the
difference. Therefore the total computation complexity is
O(|Ni|(l + log(a¯))), where a¯ is the upper bound of the
admissible range for the random selection of a(k)ij .
As a result, for a particular node vi, the total computation
overhead of each iteration is O(|Ni|l). 
From Lemma 1, it can be seen that the computational
complexity of our approach does not increase with network
size but rather with the number of neighbors (so the computa-
tional complexity of our approach is moderate even for large
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networks with moderate connections). In Sec. VIII-C, we will
use a network of Raspberry Pi boards to experimentally verify
that the computational complexity is easily manageable on
resource-constrained micro-controller based real-time control
systems.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONVERGENCE
In this section, we first show that average consensus will be
guaranteed under the confidential interaction protocol. Then
we provide convergence speed analysis of our approach.
Let x ∈ Rn denote the augmented state vector of all nodes.
The network dynamics in (3) can be rewritten as:
x[k + 1] = P(k)x[k] (13)
where P(k) = I−εL(k) is the Perron matrix and L(k) = [l(k)ij ]
is the time-varying Laplacian matrix defined by
l
(k)
ij =
{∑
j∈Ni a
(k)
ij i = j
−a(k)ij i 6= j
(14)
Theorem 1: For a connected network of N nodes, if the
coupling weights a(k)ij in (14) are established according to
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and
the admissible range [a, a¯] for the random selection of a(k)ij
satisfies 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
, then the system will achieve
average consensus with states converging to
lim
k→∞
x[k] = α1 with α = Avg[0] =
1
N
1Tx[0] (15)
Proof : The proof can be obtained by following the similar
line of reasoning of Theorem 2 in [4]. 
Remark 1: Since the framework allows time-varying
weighted matrix A(k), it can easily be extended to the case
with switching interaction graphs according to [30].
To analyze the convergence speed of our approach, follow-
ing the convergence definition in [31] and [32], we define the
convergence rate as at least γ ∈ (0, 1) if there exists a positive
constant C such that
∥∥x[k]−α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk holds for all k, where
α is the average value of the initial states of all nodes in (15).
Note that a smaller γ means a faster convergence speed.
Theorem 2: For a connected network of N nodes, if the
coupling weights a(k)ij in (14) are established according to
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and
the admissible range [a, a¯] for the random selection of a(k)ij
satisfies 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
, then the convergence rate of
our privacy-preserving average consensus algorithm is at least
γ = (1− ηN−1) 1N−1 ∈ (0, 1) with η = min{1− ε∆a¯2, εa2},
meaning that there exists a positive constant C such that∥∥x[k]− α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk holds for all k.
Proof: For iteration k = 0, since 1TP(0) = 1T holds,
we have 1Tx[1] = 1TP(0)x[0] = 1Tx[0]. So we have
α = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj [0] =
1
N
∑N
j=1 xj [1].
For iteration k ≥ 1, each random number a(k)ij is randomly
chosen from [a, a¯] by node i with 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
. Further
taking into account P(k) = I− εL(k), we have the following
properties for P(k)’s (i, i)th element p(k)ii and (i, j)th element
p
(k)
ij for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N :
p
(k)
ii = 1− ε
∑
j∈Ni
a
(k)
ija(k)ji ≥ 1− ε∆a¯2 ∀ vi ∈ V (16)
and{
p
(k)
ij = 0 ∀ vi ∈ V and vj /∈ Ni ∪ {vi}
p
(k)
ij = εa
(k)
ija(k)ji ≥ εa2 ∀ vi ∈ V and vj ∈ Ni
(17)
Defining η as η , min{1−ε∆a¯2, εa2}, we have 0 < η < 1
due to 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
. According to (16) and (17), we
have p(k)ij ≥ η for vi ∈ V and vj ∈ Ni ∪ {vi}.
Denote P(k)P(k−1) · · ·P(s) as Φ(k, s). Note that
Φ(k, k) = P(k) holds for all k. Since P(k) (k ≥ 1)
satisfies the Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 5 in [33], following its
Proposition 1, we have∣∣∣φ(k,s)ij − 1N ∣∣∣ ≤ 21 + η−N+11− ηN−1 (1− ηN−1) k−sN−1 (18)
for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N and k ≥ s ≥ 1 where φ(k,s)ij represents
the (i, j)th element of Φ(k, s).
From (13), we have
x[k] = P(k−1)P(k−2) · · ·P(1)x[1] = Φ(k − 1, 1)x[1] (19)
for k ≥ 2. Combining (16) and (17) with (19), we obtain∥∥x[k]− α1∥∥ = ∥∥Φ(k − 1, 1)x[1]− α1∥∥
=
( N∑
i=1
∣∣∣ N∑
j=1
(φ
(k−1,1)
ij −
1
N
)xj [1]
∣∣∣2)1/2
≤
( N∑
i=1
( N∑
j=1
∣∣∣φ(k−1,1)ij − 1N ∣∣∣2∥∥x[1]∥∥2))1/2
≤ 2N 1 + η
−N+1
1− ηN−1 (1− η
N−1)
k−2
N−1
∥∥x[1]∥∥
(20)
for k ≥ 2, where we used Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the
derivation. By re-arranging the terms, we have∥∥x[k]− α1∥∥ ≤ C0γk (21)
for k ≥ 2, where
C0 = 2N
∥∥x[1]∥∥ 1 + η−N+1
(1− ηN−1)N+1N−1
(22)
and
γ = (1− ηN−1) 1N−1 (23)
Given η ∈ (0, 1), it can be easily verified that γ ∈ (0, 1)
holds.
Defining C as
C , max{∥∥x[0]− α1∥∥, ∥∥x[1]− α1∥∥γ−1, C0}
we have ∥∥x[k]− α1∥∥ ≤ Cγk (24)
for all k. Therefore, the convergence rate of our privacy-
preserving average consensus algorithm is at least γ = (1 −
ηN−1)
1
N−1 ∈ (0, 1). 
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From Theorem 2, it can be seen that the initial weights will
affect the absolute convergence time as they affect the param-
eter C in (24). However, they will not affect the exponential
convergence rate γ according to (23). According to (24), it
is easy to see that a smaller γ leads to a faster convergence.
Given the relationship γ = (1 − ηN−1) 1N−1 , to get a faster
convergence speed, i.e., a smaller γ, it suffices to increase η.
Further noting η = min{1−ε∆a¯2, εa2}, increasing η amounts
to decreasing a¯ and/or increasing a, which in turn reduces the
size of the range [a, a¯]. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
the size of the admissible range [a, a¯] and the convergence
speed. However, this trade-off only matters if one wants to
protect the intermediate states from being inferrable by honest-
but-curious attackers (a reduced [a, a¯] reduces the admissible
range for randomizing aij and aji, and hence enables an
honest-but-curious attacker vi to get a better range estimation
of its neighbor vj’s intermediate states xj [k] (k ≥ 1) based
on received ∆xij). If the intermediate states do not need to
be protected as in the consensus problem considered in this
paper (where only the initial state values matter), we can
still enhance convergence speed by reducing the size of the
admissible range [a, a¯]. In fact, even if we reduce the size of
[a, a¯] to zero for iterations after k = 0, i.e., setting a = a¯
starting from k = 1 (note that in the initial iteration k = 0
coupling weights a(0)ij should be randomly chosen from R),
our approach can still guarantee the privacy of initial state
values, as is clear from the proof of Theorem 3 in Sec. V-A.
V. ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
Privacy and security are sometimes used interchangeably
in the literature but here we make the distinction explicit.
Among the control community privacy is equivalent to the
concept of unobservability. Privacy is also closely related
to the concept of semantic security from cryptography [28].
Both concepts essentially concern with an honest-but-curious
adversary which is interested in learning the states of the
network but conforms to the rules of the system. Security,
on the other hand, deals with a broader issue which includes
learning the states as well as the possibilities of exploiting the
system to cause damages.
A. Privacy Guarantees
Our protocol provides protection against an honest-but-
curious adversary, which can be a node in the network or
an observer eavesdropping communication links.
The Paillier encryption algorithm is known to provide se-
mantic security, i.e., Indistinguishability under Chosen Plain-
text Attack (IND-CPA) [26]. As a result, the recipient of the
first transmission E(−xi) cannot see the value of xi at all
time.
Before analyzing the privacy-preserving performance of our
approach, we first give a definition of privacy preservation used
throughout this paper.
Definition 1: For a connected network of N nodes, the
privacy of the initial value xi[0] of node vi is preserved if
an honest-but-curious adversary cannot estimate the value of
xi[0] with any accuracy.
Eve
Alice Bob
∆xEA ∆xEB
∆xAB
Alice Eve othernodes
∆xEA
E
D
Fig. 2. Two connection configurations considered in the proofs of Theorem
3 (subplot a) and Theorem 4 (subplot b).
Definition 1 requires that an honest-but-curious adversary
cannot even find a range for a private value and thus is more
stringent than the privacy preservation definition considered in
[34]–[36] which defines privacy preservation as the inability
of an adversary to uniquely determine the protected value.
It is worth noting that by a finite range, we mean lower and
upper bounds that an adversary may obtain based on accessible
information. We do not consider representation bounds caused
by the finite number of bytes that can be used to represent a
number in a computer.
As per the naming convention in cryptography, it is custom-
ary to name the legitimate sender and receiver participants as
A (Alice) and B (Bob), and the adversary as E (Eve).
Theorem 3: For a connected network of N nodes with
system dynamics in (3), we assume that all nodes follow
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1. An
honest-but-curious node Eve who can receive messages from
a neighboring node Alice cannot learn the initial state of Alice
if Alice is also connected to another legitimate node Bob.
Proof : Without loss of generality, we consider the con-
nection configuration illustrated in Fig. 2(a) where Eve can
interact with both Alice and Bob. If Eve cannot infer the
state of Alice or Bob in this configuration, neither can it when
either the Alice–Eve connection or the Bob–Eve connection is
removed which reduces the amount of information accessible
to Eve.
We propose a new privacy-proving approach based on the
indistinguishability of a private value’s arbitrary variation to
Eve. We define the information accessible to Eve at iteration k
as IE [k] =
{
∆xEA[k], ∆xEB [k], xE [k], a
(k)
EA, a(k)EB}. So
as time evolves, the cumulated information accessible to Eve
can be summarized as IE =
⋃∞
k=0 IE [k].
To show that the privacy of the initial value xA[0] can
be preserved against Eve, i.e., Eve cannot estimate the value
of xA[0] with any accuracy, it suffices to show that under
any initial value x¯A[0] 6= xA[0] the information accessible to
Eve, i.e., I¯E could be exactly the same as IE , the cumulated
information accessible to Eve under xA[0]. This is because the
only information available for Eve to infer the initial value
xA[0] is IE , and if IE could be the outcome under any initial
values of xA[0], then Eve has no way to even find a range for
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the initial value xA[0]. Therefore, we only need to prove that
for any x¯A[0] 6= xA[0], I¯E = IE could hold.
Next we show that there exist initial values of xB [0] and
coupling weights satisfying the requirements of the confiden-
tial interaction protocol in Sec. III that make I¯E = IE hold
under x¯A[0] 6= xA[0]. (Note that the alternative initial values
of xB [0] should guarantee that the agents still converge to the
original average value after xA[0] is altered to x¯A[0].) More
specifically, under the following initial condition
x¯B [0] = xA[0] + xB [0]− x¯A[0] (25)
and coupling weights
a¯
(0)
EA = a(0)EA
a¯
(0)
EB = a(0)EB
a¯
(0)
AE = a(0)AE(xE [0]− xA[0])/(xE [0]− x¯A[0])
a¯
(0)
AB = (xA[0]− x¯A[0])/(εa(0)BA(xB [0]− xA[0])) + a(0)AB
a¯
(0)
BE = a(0)BE(xE [0]− xB [0])/(xE [0]− x¯B [0])
a¯
(0)
BA = a(0)BA(xB [0]− xA[0])/(x¯B [0]− x¯A[0])
a¯
(k)
ij = a(k)ij ∀ i, j ∈ {A,B,E}, k = 1, 2, . . .
(26)
it can be easily verified that I¯E = IE holds for any x¯A[0] 6=
xA[0]. Note that (25) is used to guarantee that the consensus
value does not change under the new initial values x¯A[0]
and x¯B [0]. Therefore, the honest-but-curious node Eve cannot
learn the initial state of a neighboring node Alice based on
accessible information if Alice is also connected to another
legitimate node Bob. 
It is worth noting that conventional observability based
approaches in e.g., [16] and [17] cannot be used to analyze
node Eve’s ability to infer the states of Alice because the
coupling weights a(k)AE are not available to Eve.
Remark 2: In the confidential interaction protocol, we allow
the coupling weights for k = 0 to be unrestricted and random
chosen from R. This unrestricted admissible range for coupling
weights of k = 0 is key to guarantee that no matter what value
x¯A[0] is, the resulting a¯
(0)
EA, a¯(0)EB , a¯(0)AE , a¯(0)AB , a¯(0)BE , and
a¯
(0)
BA in the left-hand-side of (26) are always admissible and
hence guarantee the achievement of the defined privacy.
Remark 3: From the derivation in Theorem 3, one can get
that if only initial states need to be protected, as defined in
Definition 1, then encrypting messages for the initial iteration
k = 0 is sufficient. Avoiding encrypting messages after the ini-
tial iteration can greatly reduce the computational complexity
to a one-time cost and is highly desirable when computational
complexity is of concern. Of course, if all intermediate mes-
sages need to be protected from being disclosed to an external
eavesdropper, we still need to encrypt exchanged messages
after the initial iteration.
Remark 4: Given that the random distribution of aij can
be non-stationary, the approach is also resilient to statistical
inferences based on law-of-large-numbers [37].
Remark 5: From the derivation, we can see that when
Alice is connected to at least one legitimate node Bob, the
collusion of multiple honest-but-curious nodes does not help
the inference of Alice’s initial state.
Remark 6: Following the same line of reasoning, it can be
obtained that an honest-but-curious node Eve 1 cannot infer
the initial state of a neighboring node Alice if Alice is also
connected to another honest-but-curious node Eve 2 that does
not collude with Eve 1.
Remark 7: Our approach can enable privacy even when Eve
can interact with all neighbors of Alice, which is not allowed
in existing approaches in [12] and [13].
Based on the analysis framework, we can also obtain a
situation where it is possible for Eve to infer other nodes’
states which should be avoided.
Theorem 4: For a connected network of N nodes with
system dynamics in (3), we assume that all nodes follow the
confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1. If a node
Alice is connected to the rest of the network only through
an (or a group of colluding) honest-but-curious node(s) Eve,
Alice’s initial state can be uniquely inferred by Eve in an
asymptotic sense.
Proof : If Alice is directly connected to multiple honest-
but-curious nodes that collude with each other, then these
nodes can share information with each other to cooperatively
estimate Alice’s initial state, and hence can be regarded as
one node. Therefore, we can only consider the case in which
Alice is only connected to one honest-but-curious node Eve,
as illustrated in Fig. 2(b). In this case, from the perspective
of the honest-but-curious node Eve, the measurement seen at
each time step k is ∆xEA[k] = a
(k)
AEa(k)EA(xA[k] − xE [k])
with ∆xEA[k] = −∆xAE [k]. From the system dynamics in
(8), Eve knows
xA[0] = xA[P ]− ε
P−1∑
k=0
∆xAE [k]
= xA[P ] + ε
P−1∑
k=0
∆xEA[k]
(27)
and hence can construct the following observer to estimate the
initial value of xA[0]:
xˆA[0] = xE [P ] + ε
P−1∑
k=0
∆xEA[k] (28)
As P goes to infinity, average consensus will be achieved
asymptotically, i.e., limP∞ xA[P ] = limP∞ xE [P ] = α =∑N
i=1 xi[0]/N , which leads to
lim
P∞ xˆA[0] = limP∞
(
xE [P ] + ε
P−1∑
k=0
∆xEA[k]
)
= lim
P∞
(
xA[P ] + ε
P−1∑
k=0
∆xEA[k]
)
= xA[0]
(29)
Therefore Eve can uniquely infer Alice’s initial state xA[0] in
an asymptotic sense through the estimator (28). 
Theorem 4 implies that the single neighbor configuration
should always be avoided, which is also required by other
noise-based privacy protocols such as [12] and [13].
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Alice Bob
Eve
kpA
c, kpA ⇒ c′, kpA
c = EA(−xA) c′ = EA(−xA + ξ)
Alice
k′sA, k
′
pA
Bob
k′sA
Eve
k′sA
c,k′sA,E ′A[H(c)]
k′sA
(C)
(B)
Fig. 3. Illustration of attacks from an active attacker (a) and the defense
mechanism with a digital signature (b).
B. Security Solution
Due to the additive homomorphic property, the Paillier
cryptosystem is vulnerable to active adversaries who may
attempt to alter the message being sent through the channel.
Although such adversaries cannot find out the exact states
of the communicating nodes, they can still inflict significant
damage to the system.
Consider the scenario where the communication from node
Alice to Bob is intercepted by an active adversary Eve (cf.
Fig. 3(a)). Since Alice’s public key kpA is sent along with
E(−x1), Eve may use the additive homomorphism to inject
an arbitrary noise ξ to the original message E(−x1) to sway
it to E(−x1+ξ). If Bob has no way to tell whether the received
message has been modified, Eve may exploit this vulnerability
to make the network either converge to a wrong value or not
converge at all.
In applications where security is of prime concern, it is
imperative to be able to verify the integrity of any received
message. Here we propose a solution to provide resilience
against active adversaries. Our basic idea is to attach a digital
signature to exchanged messages in the confidential interaction
protocol, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The signature requires an
additional pair of public/private keys (k′pA, k
′
sA) and a hash
function H(·), and is represented as (k′sA, E ′A [H(c)]) where
c is the encrypted message. The additional private key k′sA is
sent so that Bob can decrypt E ′A [H(c)] and check if the result-
ing H(c) matches the received c in terms of the hash operation
H(·). Based on the attached digital signature, the recipient can
verify possible modifications during communication.
Lemma 2: When Alice and Bob use the mechanism in Fig.
3(b) for message transmission and integrity verification, Eve
cannot fake Alice’s identity by forging a signature that could
pass the verification of Bob.
Proof : From the defense mechanism illustrated in Fig. 3(b),
it can be seen that without the public key k′pA, Eve cannot
forge a valid signature (that can be decrypted by Bob), any
Eve’s attempt to modify c will cause a mismatch between
received c and decrypted H(c) in terms of the hash operation
H(·) (cf. [38] for details). Therefore, the defense mechanism
can provide resilience against active adversaries. 
VI. EXTENSIONS TO OTHER CONSENSUS
Using the same confidential interaction protocol, we can
ensure the privacy of other variants of average consensus.
Here we show the applications to three other commonly used
consensus problems, i.e., the weighted average consensus,
maximum consensus, and minimum consensus.
A. Weighted Average Consensus
Weighted average consensus seeks convergence of all states
to a weighed sum of the initial state, i.e.,
∑N
j=1 wjxj [0]∑N
j=1 wj
with
wj > 0 being the weights. According to [4], weighted average
consensus can be achieved by using the following update rule:
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] +
ε
wi
∑
vj∈Ni
a
(k)
ij (xj [k]− xi[k]) (30)
Note that the average consensus is in fact a special case of
the weighted average consensus with all wi being equal to the
same constant.
Theorem 5: For a connected network of N nodes, if the
coupling weights a(k)ij in (30) are established according to
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and
the admissible range [a, a¯] for the random selection of a(k)ij
satisfies 0 < a < a¯ <
√
mini wi
ε∆ , then the system will achieve
weighted average consensus with states converging to
lim
k→∞
xi[k] =
∑N
j=1 wjxj [0]∑N
j=1 wj
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (31)
Proof : The proof can be obtained by following a similar
line of reasoning of Theorem 1 in [39]. 
B. Maximum Consensus
The maximum consensus seeks the convergence of all
states to the maximal initial value among all states, i.e.,
limk∞ xi[k] = maxj xj [0] for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Next we
show how to use the confidential interaction protocol in
Sec. III to guarantee the privacy in maximum consensus.
In contrast to the conventional maximum consensus protocol
where the current state of a node is directly replaced with
the maximum state among its neighbors [40], we formulate
maximum consensus problem as a nonlinear dynamical system
to fit into our confidential interaction protocol.
We design the update rule as
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) (32)
Compared with the average consensus protocol, the differ-
ence is that we replaced the summation operation with the
“max” operator. What is more important is the inclusion of the
node itself in the computation, which ensures that the output
of the max operator is non-negative.
In this new maximum consensus approach, the weighted
state difference can still be calculated using the confidential
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interaction protocol in Sec. III, but the operation of multiplying
a node’s own random weight to the weighted difference, i.e.,
a12 in (11), can be removed to simplify the computation
because there is no need to guarantee a symmetric interaction
graph any more. For this reason, here we always set a12 in
(11) to 1, which leads to the coupling weight in (32) above.
Furthermore, to guarantee the convergence of maximum con-
sensus, the admissible range [a, a¯] for the random selection
of a(k)ji should satisfy 0 < a < a¯ < 1.
Theorem 6: For a connected network of N nodes, under
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and
a
(k)
ji ∈ [a, a¯] for k ≥ 0 with 0 < a < a¯ < 1, the update rule
(32) can achieve maximum consensus, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
xi[k] = max
1≤j≤N
xj [0], i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (33)
Proof : According to (32), we have
xi[k + 1]− xi[k] = max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k])
≥ a(k)ii(xi[k]− xi[k]) = 0
(34)
So xi[k + 1] − xi[k] ≥ 0 always holds for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
i.e., the value of each node is non-decreasing.
Let xp[k] = maxi xi[k] at step k. According to (32) and
0 < a
(k)
jp < 1, we have
xp[k + 1]− xp[k] = max
vj∈Np∪{vp}
a
(k)
jp(xj [k]− xp[k]) ≤ 0
(35)
Since the value of each node is non-decreasing, we have xp[k+
1] = xp[k], i.e., xp[k] is time-invariant.
Next we show that all the other nodes will stay less or equal
to xp[k]. For every node i, we have
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) (36)
Since maxvj∈Ni∪{vi} a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) ≥ 0 holds, we have
max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) ≤ max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
(xj [k]− xi[k])
≤ max
vj∈V
(xj [k]− xi[k]) ≤ xp[k]− xi[k]
(37)
where we used the facts 0 < a(k)ji < 1 and xp[k] =
maxi xi[k]. Combing (37) with (36) leads to
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k])
≤ xi[k] + xp[k]− xi[k] = xp[k]
(38)
As a result, the maximum value is invariant with respect to k.
Let maxi xi[k] = maxi xi[0] = α. We can now define
the error vector as δ[k] = α1 − x[k], where x[k] =
[x1[k], x2[k], · · · , xN [k]]T . Note that δi[k] ≥ 0 holds for all i
and k. Theorem 6 is thus equivalent to proving
lim
k→∞
δ[k] = 0 (39)
According to (32), the dynamics of δi[k] is given by
δi[k + 1]− δi[k] = − max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) (40)
Define the Lyapunov function V (δ[k]) = δ[k]T δ[k] ≥ 0,
where the equality holds only when δ[k] = 0, then we have
V (δ[k + 1])− V (δ[k]) = δ[k + 1]T δ[k + 1]− δ[k]T δ[k]
(41)
Expanding the right-hand-side (RHS) yields:
RHS = (δ[k + 1]− δ[k])T (δ[k + 1] + δ[k])
= −
∑
vi∈V
max
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k])(δi[k + 1] + δi[k])
≤ 0
(42)
The equality holds when maxvj∈Ni∪{vi} a
(k)
ji(xj [k]−xi[k]) =
0 is true for i = 1, 2, . . . , N , i.e., when the maximum
consensus is achieved. So the Lyapunov function V (δ[k]) will
keep decreasing until the maximum consensus is achieved. 
C. Minimum Consensus
In contrast to maximum consensus, the minimum consensus
problem seeks the convergence of all states to the minimal
initial value among all states, i.e., limk∞ xi[k] = minj xj [0]
for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Following the same idea as maximum con-
sensus, we propose a new update rule for achieving minimum
consensus to fit into our confidential interaction protocol:
xi[k + 1] = xi[k] + min
vj∈Ni∪{vi}
a
(k)
ji(xj [k]− xi[k]) (43)
Similar to Theorem 6, we can obtain the following results
for minimum consensus:
Theorem 7: For a connected network of N nodes, under
the confidential interaction protocol illustrated in Fig. 1 and
a
(k)
ji ∈ [a, a¯] for k ≥ 0 with 0 < a < a¯ < 1, the update rule
(43) can achieve minimum consensus, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
xi[k] = min
1≤j≤N
xj [0], i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (44)
Proof : The proof follows the same line of reasoning as
Theorem 6 and is omitted. 
VII. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In addition to the constraint imposed on a(k)ij , there are other
technical issues that must be addressed for the implementation
of our confidential interaction protocol.
A. Quantization
Real-world applications typically have xi ∈ R which are
represented by floating point numbers in modern computing
architectures. On the contrary, encryption algorithms only
work on unsigned integers. Define the casting function f(·, ·) :
R× R→M⊂ Z and its inverse f−1(·, ·) :M× R→ R as
f(x,Q) = dQxcM , f−1(y,Q) =
y
Q
(45)
where d·cM maps the input to the nearest integer in M. For
the Paillier cryptosystem, this mapping is equivalent to the
rounding operation, hence the step size is 1 which is uniform.
Consequently the maximum quantization error is bounded by
max
x∈R
|x− f−1(f(x,Q), Q)| = 1
Q
(46)
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Although the quantization error is unavoidable, it can be
made arbitrarily small by using a large enough Q in (45). In
practice we choose a sufficiently large value for Q so that
the quantization error is negligible. This is exactly how we
convert the state xi of a node from real value to a fixed length
integer and back to a floating point number. The conversion
is performed at each iteration of the protocol.
B. Subtraction and Negative Values
Another issue is how to treat the sign of an integer for
encryption. [19] solves this problem by mapping negative
values to the end of the group Zn where n = pq is given
by the public key. We offer an alternative solution by taking
advantage of the fact that encryption algorithms blindly treat
bit strings as an unsigned integer. In our implementation all
integer values are stored in fix-length integers (i.e., long
int in C) and negative values are left in two’s complement
format. Encryption and intermediate computations are carried
out as if the underlying data were unsigned. When the final
message is decrypted, the overflown bits (bits outside the fixed
length) are discarded and the remaining binary number is
treated as a signed integer which is later converted back to
a real value.
VIII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS AND HARDWARE
EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first numerically verify effectiveness of
the proposed approach and show its advantage over existing
state-of-the-art approaches. Then we provide hardware exper-
imental results on a resource-constrained Raspberry-Pi board
based micro-controller network to demonstrate the efficiency
of the proposed approach.
A. Numerical Implementation of the Proposed Approach
To illustrate the capability of our protocol, we implemented
the consensus protocol in C/C++. We used an open-source
C implementation of the Paillier cryptosystem [41] because
it allowed byte-level access. For each exchange between
two nodes, the states were converted to 64-bit integers by
multiplying Q = 105. The weights a(k)ij were also scaled
up similarly and represented by 64-bit random integers. The
encryption/decryption keys were set to 256-bit long.
The first simulation had four nodes connected in a undi-
rected ring, which led to ∆ = maxi |Ni| = 2. We set the
step-size to ε = 0.5. Given 0 < a < a¯ < 1√
ε∆
= 1√
0.5∗2 = 1,
we set the admissible range to [a, a¯] = [0.01, 0.99]. The initial
states were set to {1, 2, 4, 8} respectively and the average is
3.75. Each node used a static key pair which was initialized
once at the beginning. The states’ convergence to the average
is shown in Fig. 4.
The plot of received encrypted messages which encoded the
weighted difference between two nodes is given in Fig. 5. It
is worth noting that although the states have converged to the
average, the encrypted weighted differences still appear to be
random to an unintended observer.
The second simulation considered the weighted aver-
age consensus. Under the same initial condition as the
Time Step
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
St
at
e
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
x1[k]
x2[k]
x3[k]
x4[k]
Avg
Fig. 4. Convergence to the average consensus. The states converge to the
average consensus value 3.75 in about 10 steps.
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Fig. 5. Encrypted weighted differences vs time step. Although the states have
converged after 10 steps, the encrypted differences still appear to be random.
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Fig. 6. Convergence to the weighted average consensus. The states converge
to the weighted average consensus value 4.9 in about 15 steps.
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Fig. 7. Convergence to the maximum consensus. The states converge to the
maximum consensus value 8 in less than 10 steps.
first example, the nodes also had the associated weights
{0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. The step size ε was set to 0.05. Under
0 < a < a¯ <
√
mini wi
ε∆ =
√
0.1
0.05∗2 = 1, we set the admissible
range to [a, a¯] = [0.01, 0.99]. Fig. 6 shows that the states
converge to the weighted average value 4.9.
The third simulation considered the maximum consensus,
using the same graph structure and initial condition. Fig. 7
shows that the states converge to the exact maximum in about
7 steps.
The computational overhead caused by the encryption is
manageable. Without any hardware-specific optimization, it
takes about 7 ms to compute one exchange of state on a
desktop computer with a 3.4 GHz CPU and 4.00 GB memory.
B. Comparison with Existing Results
In this subsection, we show the advantages of the proposed
average consensus approach over existing data-obfuscation
based average consensus approaches, more specifically, the
decaying-noise approach by Mo and Murray [12], the finite-
noise-sequence approach by Manitara and Hadjicostis [13],
and the differential-privacy based approach by Huang et al.
[11]. The differential-privacy based approach in [11] injects
uncorrelated Laplace noise to exchanged states to ensure the
privacy of participating nodes and is subject to a trade-off
between privacy and accuracy. To guarantee the accuracy of
average consensus, the approaches in [12] and [13] employ
correlated noises, which, however, compromise the achievable
privacy. In this subsection, we use numerical simulations to
show that all these approaches are vulnerable to an external
eavesdropper.
In the numerical simulation, we used the network topology
and weight matrix provided in [12], i.e.,
A =
1
4

2 1 0 0 1
1 2 1 0 0
0 1 2 0 1
0 0 0 3 1
1 0 1 1 1
 (47)
We set the initial states of five nodes to {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
respectively.
We consider the case where node 1’s communication with
all its neighbors is tapped by an external eavesdropper Eve.
Eve also knows the internal dynamics and network interaction
topology, i.e., the A matrix.
1) Comparison with the approach in [12]: We first simu-
lated the approach in [12]. For consistency and ease of reading,
we borrow the notations from [12], where the authors denote
the internal state and the transmitted state by xi[k] and x+i [k],
respectively, i.e.,
x+i [k] = xi[k] + wi[k] (48)
where wi[k] is a random noise specified as follows
wi[k] =
{
vi[0], if k = 0
ρkvi[k]− ρk−1vi[k − 1] otherwise
(49)
In (49), ρ ∈ (0, 1) holds and vi[k] is a normally dis-
tributed random variable with zero mean and unit variance.
{vi[k]}i=1,...,N, k=0,1,... are jointly independent but from (49),
it is clear that the injected noise wi[k] is time-correlated.
Each node updates its internal state by
xi[k + 1] = aiix
+
i [k] +
∑
vj∈Ni
aijx
+
j [k] (50)
Based on the assumption that Eve has access to the in-bound
and out-bound messages of node 1 (i.e., x+1 [k] and x
+
j [k] for
vj ∈ N1) as well as the interaction dynamics/topology (i.e.,
a1j), we can build an observer to estimate node 1’s initial state
as follows:
• The initial state of the observer is set to the first out-going
transmission from node 1, i.e.
z[0] = x+1 [0] (51)
• The update of the observer is based on accumulating the
difference between the transmitted state and the predicted
state
z[k+1] = z[k]+x+1 [k+1]−
(
a11x
+
1 [k]+
∑
vj∈N1
a1jx
+
j [k]
)
(52)
It is shown in Fig. 8 that as the network converges and all
node states approach the average consensus value, the observer
also converges to node 1’s true initial value.
In contrast, with our method all the messages are encrypted
by design. Consequently, Eve cannot gain any advantage by
wiretapping the communication.
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Fig. 8. If Eve wiretaps all the messages of node 1 and has access to node
dynamics and interaction topology, then the initial state of node 1 can be
estimated under the privacy protocol in [12].
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Fig. 9. If Eve wiretaps all the messages of node 1 and has access to node
dynamics and interaction topology, then the initial state of node 1 can be
estimated under the privacy protocol in [13].
2) Comparison with the approach in [13]: Although using
a different noise sequence, the approach in [13] builds on a
similar noise-injection approach to that of [12] (in the sense
that later noise will cancel out previous noise). Therefore, we
used the same observer design as in the simulation of [12].
Again we obtained that as the network converged, the observer
value converged to node 1’s true initial state, as depicted in
Fig. 9.
On the contrary, such external eavesdropper gains no in-
formation from our protocol where transmitted messages are
encrypted inherently.
3) Comparison with the approach in [11]: We next show
the vulnerability of the approach in [11] to an external eaves-
dropper. We built a naive estimator that guesses the initial
state by taking the value of the initial out-bound message of
the node. Using the notations from [11], the estimated state is
Noise Level c
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Avg_Err
Est_Err
Fig. 10. Although the differential-privacy based approach guarantees that the
initial state cannot be estimated exactly, the accuracy of the final consensus
value and the accuracy of the estimated initial value are correlated.
given by
z = x1[0] = θ1[0] + η1[0] (53)
where x1 is the sent message, θ1[0] is the true initial state, and
η1[0] is a random noise generated from a Laplace distribution
Lap(cq0).
We then varied the noise parameter c and repeated the
simulation for 500 times. The result is summarized in Fig. 10
with Avg Err and Est Err denoting error in consensus value
achieving and initial state estimation respectively. We can
conclude that although the differential-privacy based approach
can use a large noise level to prevent an external eavesdropper
from accurately inferring the initial state, the noise will also
lead to a large error in the final consensus value. As a result,
when an application calls for higher accuracy of the consensus
result, the risk of disclosing one’s initial state also becomes
higher.
Our method protects the privacy by an encrypted message-
exchange mechanism that does not affect the accuracy of the
final consensus value. Therefore the user does not have to
worry about the trade-off between accuracy and privacy.
C. Hardware Experiments
To confirm the efficiency of the secure and privacy-
preserving average consensus approach in real-world cyber-
physical systems, we also implemented the proposed approach
on six Raspberry Pi boards with 64-bit ARMv8 CPU and 1
GB RAM (cf. Fig. 11, source code available at [42]).
In the implementation, the communication was conducted
through Wi-Fi based on the “sys/socket.h” C library. Paillier
encryption/decryption was realized using the “libpaillier-0.8”
library from [43]. To obtain ∆xij in a pairwise interaction, a
node employs a request message to initialize the interaction
and the other node replies with a response message. In a multi-
node network, for a node to be able to simultaneously receive
requests and responses from multiple neighbors, parallelism
needed to be introduced. The “pthread” C library was used to
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Fig. 11. A network of six Raspberry Pi boards.
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Fig. 12. All nodes converge to the average consensus value in the experi-
mental verification using Raspberry Pi boards. The states have initial values
as 777, 168, 788, 242, 610, and 899, respectively and they all converge to the
average consensus value 580.67 in about 13 steps.
generate multiple parallel threads to handle incoming requests
and responses. Each time a node receives a request/response, it
generates a new thread to handle it and immediately listens for
more requests. Because in the implementation, it is impossible
to start all nodes simultaneously, a counter is introduced on
each node and its value is embedded in each request/response
packet to help nodes make sure that they are on the same pace.
For 64 byte encryption key, the size of the actual packet is 144
bytes, which includes all necessary headers and stuffing bytes.
For each interaction, the average processing latency was 7.8
ms, which is acceptable for most real-time control systems.
The implementation result is given in Fig. 12, which shows
that perfect consensus can be achieved.
IX. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a decentralized secure and
privacy-preserving protocol for the network consensus prob-
lem which can guarantee the security and privacy of a node as
long as it has at least one legitimate neighbor. In contrast to
existing data-obfuscation based average consensus approaches
which are vulnerable to an external eavesdropper, we encode
randomness into the system dynamics with the help of an addi-
tive homomorphic cryptosystem which allows a deterministic
convergence to the average (subject to a quantization error).
The protocol also provides resilience to passive attackers and
allows easy incorporation of active attacker defending mech-
anisms. In addition to average consensus, our protocol can
be easily extended to enable security and privacy in weighted
average consensus and maximum/minimum consensus under
new update rules. Both numerical simulations and hardware
experiments are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the approach.
The proposed approach offers several advantages over
existing privacy-preserving average consensus protocols us-
ing noise-injection based data obfuscation, such as the
uncorrelated-noise (differential-privacy) based approach in
[11] and the correlated-noise based approaches in [12], [13].
First, compared with the differential-privacy based approach,
our approach can guarantee convergence to the consensus
value (subject to a quantization error) in a deterministic man-
ner. Secondly, our approach encrypts the exchanged messages
and is resilient to external eavesdroppers wiretapping the
communication channel, whereas an external eavesdropper
can easily defeat the approaches in [12] and [13] by using
a naive observer, as confirmed by the numerical simulation
results in Sec. VIII-B. Furthermore, the proposed approach
is naturally extendable to time-varying networks, whereas
existing noise-injection based data obfuscation approaches all
assume time-invariant parameters, which could be troublesome
if the topology of the network or the number of nodes is not
constant.
On the other hand, although the computational overhead
introduced by the encryption algorithm (7 ms in numerical
simulations and 7.8 ms in hardware experiments) is acceptable
in most real-time control systems, it is indeed higher compared
to the unencrypted alternatives. We argue that the benefits of
using encryption to preserve privacy and security outweigh the
computational burden which is easily manageable on modern
micro-controllers.
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